CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION

DISTANCE EDUCATION IN A TIME OF CRISIS
3__Responding to COVID-19 with IT: A Transformative Moment?
PHILIP G. ALTBACH AND HANS DE WIT

5__Distance Learning and Global Demand
NEIL KEMP

INTERNATIONALIZATION TRENDS
7__National Internationalization Policies in Low- and Mid-Income Countries
HANS DE WIT

9__German Universities Woo International Students
SIMON MORRIS-LANGE AND CORNELIA SCHU

11__Managing Internationalization in a Complex Research Landscape
TOMMY SHIH

12__Central Asia: Crossing the Threshold at Different Speeds
FARKHAD ALIMUKHAMEDOV

PRIVATE HIGHER EDUCATION
20__Introduction to the Section
DANIEL C. LEVY

21__What’s Too Private? Values and Realities in Southeast Asia
DANIEL C. LEVY

23__The Philippines’ Two Private Sectors
KAROL MARK K. YEE

25__Vietnam: The Unique Case of For-Profit Monopoly
QUANG CHAU

FOCUS ON EUROPE
27__How Diverse Are European Higher Education Systems?
BENEDETTOL EPORI AND DANIEL WAGNER-SCHUSTER

29__How Does Irish Higher Education See Itself?
ELLEN HAZELKORN AND TOM BOLAND

31__Size Matters in Turkish Higher Education
OĞUZ ESEN

FOCUS ON CHINA
14__China’s Internationalization of Higher Education: The Barrier Within
RUI YANG

16__Unprecedented Talent Program for China’s Strategic Goals
XIAOFENG WAN

18__The Belt and Road Initiative and Higher Education
AISI LI AND ALAN RUBY

FOCUS ON AFRICA
33__The Evolution of University Chancellorship in Kenya
ISHMAEL I. MUNENE

GLOBAL RANKINGS
35__Rethinking Institutional Strategies for Latin American Universities
CARLOS IVÁN MORENO AND JORGE ENRIQUE FLORES

36__Why are Australian Universities Doing So Well in the Rankings?
WILLIAM LOCKE

38__IHE ADVISORY BOARD
40__CIHE PUBLICATIONS
41__CONFERENCE CALL FOR IHE
Responding to COVID-19 with IT: A Transformative Moment?

Philip G. Altbach and Hans de Wit

With the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, most of the world’s universities have had to close campuses and send their students home. The large majority have shifted to distance education in its various forms to allow classes to continue and students to complete their studies. Teachers and students alike have had to make considerable efforts to adjust. Information technology (IT) specialists at universities around the world have been in crisis mode and have done a remarkable job migrating many courses and programs online, at least to a reasonable extent. The online industry is bombarding institutions and their teachers with tools, training modules, and other products. At least for the duration of the COVID-19 crisis, higher education is being forcibly transformed, with private providers hawking business models and IT evangelists heralding the revolution.

But questions must be asked: Is the distance revolution working, and are we in a “transformative moment”? While data is largely lacking, the answers to both of these questions are still open, but likely mostly negative. It is worth speculating on what seem to be relevant realities and trends, and possible future scenarios. We are aware that these observations are preliminary and based mainly on observational data. Nonetheless, it is worth pondering key points.

Inequalities
Without question, there are massive inequalities in the provision of higher education through distance education. This is true for countries, universities, and the academic community. There are significant variations in how distance education is received. In many lower-income countries, broadband is inadequate, spotty, or even largely absent. Reliable electricity is a problem. These issues are also problematic in some rural areas of rich countries. Many students, especially in lower-income countries and from less well-off families everywhere, do not have access to appropriate computers—efforts to use smartphones for instruction have been challenging. Less well-endowed universities in general have not developed the technical, curricular, or other infrastructure necessary for quality distance education. This is especially true for the burgeoning private higher education sector, which now accounts for perhaps half of global enrollments. Further, there are security as well as politically motivated firewalls limiting access for groups of students and teachers.

Students
Students do not seem to be enthusiastic about the online courses that they are now forced to take. While data is only indicative, students seem to be unsatisfied overall. And they are more likely to avoid participating. This is the case, in particular, for undergraduate education, the level least familiar with online delivery but also where students prefer and need more interaction with their teachers and other students. This general unhappiness may be the result of courses having suddenly been moved online with little preparation either by professors or students. The lack of motivation of students for online delivery will become an issue with the cohort planning to enter higher education this fall. There are fears that many will postpone starting their studies as long as institutions only offer online instruction. This is particularly likely for international students.

Abstract
Due to the COVID-19 crisis, higher education is being forcibly transformed. But questions must be asked: Is the distance revolution working, and are we in a “transformative moment”? Today, distance education is ubiquitous—of necessity. However, it is not necessarily very successful. Most probably, hybrid or blended education will expand. Just as MOOCs, a decade or so ago, did not produce the educational revolution that many predicted, today’s massive and hurried shift to distance education will not either.
Faculty
Faculty members are generally wary about teaching online. Before COVID-19, a significant minority in some countries had some experience with online teaching, but it is fair to say that the large majority did not, despite pressure in many universities to offer online courses. The COVID-19 crisis threw all faculty suddenly into the deep end of the online swimming pool, with no preparation. IT professionals and online experts have provided crash courses for faculty. Although most are trying, faculty of a certain age (still a majority of the faculty) lack both experience and confidence to learn new and highly unfamiliar methods and technologies. The fact is that developing high-quality online courses requires skill, new ways of thinking about pedagogy, and money. In the current rush to quickly adapt to distance requirements, these are all in short supply. Further, most academics say that distance teaching requires more time than face-to-face instruction, with no improvement in the outcomes and with less satisfaction.

Inappropriateness
Of course, a significant number of courses and subjects do not lend themselves well to distance education—or, at the very least, a great deal of ingenuity and resources are required. Obviously, laboratory-based courses in the sciences are at the top of the problematic list. Students need to use chemicals, conduct experiments, and in general get the feeling of lab work. Subjects in the humanities such as dance, music, and drama do not lend themselves either to online instruction.

The Community of Scholars—or Lack Thereof
Large traditional undergraduate lecture courses do not lend themselves to deep intellectual pursuits, yet when linked to good discussion groups, they can be quite effective. A common complaint is that most distance courses do not easily cater for group work, community building, or much communication either among students or between students and faculty. Again, there are new technological tools as well as pedagogical innovations that can assist, but these are often unavailable or require significant investment by faculty.

Exams
A major problem is how to examine students. Written assignments can be done online, as well as theses, including their presentations and defenses. But in the case of exams (the most common form of assessment, in particular at the undergraduate level and for large cohorts), there are concerns about fraud but also about privacy (through use of software to check online dishonesty during exams). According to the Dutch Student Union, there is serious concern about the use of algorithms by Google, Facebook, and the leading European provider ProctorExam. If students are denied permission by the software, they will be unable to take their exams and will be delayed in their studies.

Opportunities
This discussion does not imply that the sudden rise in online education is entirely negative. There are opportunities as well, depending on how institutions make use of the accumulated experience. The use of IT in teaching and learning and in research can become a more integrated part of our work. Faculty can partner with colleagues abroad to provide guest lectures by experts who before were only available through textbooks, thereby widening the scope of the curriculum. As we and others have advocated for years, Collaborative Online International Learning, Internationalization at Home, and Internationalization of the Curriculum are alternatives to study abroad, but require leadership commitment, strategic planning, robust pedagogical support, funding, and time: They cannot be improvised.

A Murky Future
Today, distance education is ubiquitous—of necessity. But it is not necessarily very successful. There is already evidence that many undergraduate students are unhappy about completing their semester using distance education. Completion rates will likely suffer. For many reasons, undergraduate students prefer on-campus education. Most probably,
though, hybrid or blended education (distance courses integrated in campus-based programs), already common in many countries, will expand. Master’s degree programs already widely using online courses, especially in professional fields such as business and management, are likely to expand in scope and number. But just as MOOCs, a decade or so ago, did not produce the educational revolution that many predicted, today’s massive and hurried shift to distance education will not either. Hopefully, though, it will lead to an improvement in the quality and sophistication of courses and programs by integrating the online dimension.

Distance Learning and Global Demand

Neil Kemp

International enrollments to UK distance learning (DL) degrees have stagnated over the last five years—and this, as many universities have sought to expand recruitment. Recent data indicates that 120,000 students living outside the United Kingdom were enrolled in UK DL degrees. This is the same level as five years ago and, without three UK universities establishing significant new DL partnerships, there would have been an 11 percent decline.

Universities had viewed developing DL delivery as a means to grow global enrollments, and the UK government, seeking to cut immigration, was keen to divert universities away from recruitment to UK campuses. Some UK universities have achieved growth through adopting innovative and focused approaches. For instance, the University of Edinburgh offers a suite of online master degrees; the University of Salford and the University of South Wales have established new European partnerships; and the University of the West of Scotland has achieved similar results in India. Significantly, partnerships can be vital, for a strong local partner can support teaching, marketing, and recruitment.

Where Are the Students Located?

UK DL degrees are delivered in over 200 countries, with most enrollments reported in those with historic UK ties—Canada, Cyprus, Hong Kong (SAR), Pakistan, Singapore, and the United States. These contrast directly with recruitment to UK campuses, where China, India, Germany, and some other EU countries are among the top ten.

Demand is thinly spread across many countries and this is a challenge; 104 countries each have fewer than 100 UK enrollments. In others, a handful of universities dominate: In Cyprus one UK university accounts for 95 percent, and in Pakistan one contributes 87 percent of enrollments.

Global Providers

An estimate, based on the limited data available, suggests that possibly 400,000 students internationally follow DL degrees in English, the main provider countries being the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, India, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. Australian offshore enrollments totalled 7,390 in 2017, but this was a 5 percent decline over the previous year. A further 6,850 students were following mixed mode delivery programs. US data (2018) indicates that there were 42,600 enrollments located outside the United States, a growth of 5 percent per year. This total would seem modest by comparison with UK enrollments, given the 3 million US students enrolled in full DL degrees,
and 6 million campus-based US students following some course modules online. Will the number of DL programs already available domestically in the United States provide a springboard for international growth?

Size Does Matter
Is there an optimal size for academic and financial appropriateness? Patterns are revealing: In the United Kingdom, nearly half of the international DL students were enrolled in 2018–2019 by just three of the over 100 UK universities delivering internationally. One third of universities reported less than 100 students each. Distribution is skewed and, although the detailed picture is more nuanced, the low numbers suggest that many universities might be struggling to achieve viability.

Skewed distributions are also apparent in Australia and the United States. The majority of the 1,100 US institutions reporting DL enrollments (2018) had less than 100 non-US students, with just seven universities accounting for 40 percent of all international enrollments. In Australia, only one institution reported over 1,000 enrollments and just five of 56 providers enrolled over 500; again, most institutions had less than 100. Low enrollments mean low revenues and ultimately that a university is probably not covering development and delivery costs. Further, the pricing of DL programs appears haphazard. For example, DL-delivered MBA fees from UK public universities vary from £8,000 to over £40,000.

The above suggests that there will likely be rationalization of provision, driven particularly by financial concerns, resulting in fewer universities offering DL degree programs.

MOOC patterns
Over 120 million students have registered in MOOC programs over the past 10 years; while this is a success, the rate of increase is slowing. Fifty MOOC-based degrees are available globally, but total enrollments are probably a little over 20,000, with Georgia Institute of Technology’s MS in computing accounting for over half of these. Price and prestige are both key factors in recruitment, and Georgia Tech meets both criteria: a high global ranking and a fee for the full MS of just US$9,000. (Master degrees in computing from less prestigious institutions typically cost over US$15,000.)

However, most MOOC students only follow a module or two, with completion rates just 3 percent. Their motivations are various: leisure, specialist interest, and perhaps the prestige of saying that they have “studied” a Harvard or MIT program.

Opportunities and Challenges
Globally, 400,000 DL enrollments seem modest by comparison with internationally mobile students (more than 25 million per year)—but is growth possible? The original reasons for optimism for DL remain strong, as they can offer greater student choice; provide quality assured international degrees and professional accreditations; are delivered flexibly to fit around employment and family; through economies of scale; and with opportunities for the disadvantaged and discriminated, wherever they live. Essentially: education anytime, anyhow, anywhere, and (almost) for anyone.

But challenges remain: cultural bias, with on-campus programs strongly preferred; lack of national recognition of (foreign) DL degrees; bogus operators undermining reputation; high fees; and new in-country provision addressing local demand.

However, globally the appetite for learning seems inexhaustible, and imaginative approaches will continue to evolve. DL offers another route that can both sit alongside, and be integrated with, campus-based degrees. Universities seeking to be involved need clarity of their motivation, with DL integrated within their international strategy and informed by global demand. It requires long-term commitment and investment (think 10 years); prioritizing of markets; developing relevant programs and delivery modes; offering specialist topics with professional recognition; growing international partnerships that leverage from the strengths of both partners; and dovetailing DL and campus-based programs to enhance student transferability. Perseverance, understanding, and patience are extremely valuable assets.
COVID-19
At the time of writing, the situation remains fast moving, but one response has seen many universities adopting online teaching solutions. Will this be short-lived or will it result in attitudinal changes in universities and among potential students? Most previous student surveys have shown a strong preference for a campus experience over DL degree delivery. The motivating factors for a campus experience appear challenging to replicate online, for they imply face-to-face interaction: student–teacher, student–student, and student–employer. However, what might now change will be more parts of a program offered online—as already seen in the United States over recent years.

National Internationalization Policies in Low- and Mid-Income Countries

Hans de Wit

National governments increasingly see internationalization of higher education as an important factor in economic development, trade, and reputation. In light of intensified student and staff mobility, the growing presence of branch campuses and international providers, and the keen competition to attract international talent, tertiary education institutions and national governments are mobilizing to both leverage and steer internationalization.

National tertiary education internationalization strategies and plans represent the most tangible and direct attempts by governments to play an active and decisive role, but there are substantial differences in their approaches, rationales, and priorities. One can observe a stronger attention to internationalization in the agendas of national governments such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.

A worldwide census of explicit national policies carried out by Crăciun (2018) reveals that only 11 percent of countries have an official strategy for internationalization, most adopted in the past decade. Such strategies have been developed predominantly in high-income countries—three in four by members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). European countries have taken the lead in promoting strategic thinking about internationalization at the national level—two in three national policies are from this world region.

This is not to say that other countries have not taken measures to promote internationalization. In fact, to support internationalization processes, many countries have taken both direct measures (e.g., reevaluating their visa policies to give preferential treatment to international students and scholars, establishing bilateral or multilateral agreements through memorandums of understanding, and promoting transnational education through free-trade deals) and indirect measures (e.g., supporting internationalization in political discourses and giving universities autonomy to pursue internationalization activities).

National Policies as Catalysts
Internationalization strategies and plans are still mostly developed at the institutional level. Indeed, in most cases institutions operate without a national plan in place. Where national plans do exist, institutions may operate in conflict or in alignment with them. National policies can serve as catalysts or drags on internationalization processes, but
are mostly seen as a highly positive element for the advancement of internationalization. They align internationalization with other key national priorities, such as economic growth and national security. They incentivize institutions and individuals to assist in meeting national strategic goals through internationalization. In short, not only do national internationalization strategies and plans offer a good overview of the manifestations of internationalization, they also shape key action.

However, it would be a misconception to assume that these national plans have common rationales and approaches. Differences exist between and among high-income, low-income, and middle-income countries with respect to policies and practices. Also, there are differences in explicit and implicit policies and practices, some countries having well-documented plans while others have no plans but well-defined activities.

Key Indicators

Overall, the literature points to several key indicators that can be used to guide a more systematic reflection about national internationalization policies:

- **Involvement**: Government involvement can be direct (i.e., through explicit policy documents to advance internationalization and by earmarking funds to be invested in pursuing this objective) or indirect (i.e., by supporting internationalization at a discursive level and allowing universities to pursue internationalization, but at their own expense).

- **Stakeholders**: Stakeholders may come from a wide ecosystem of actors related to tertiary education, including ministries (such as education or foreign affairs), other national agencies, the private sector, international organizations, regional bodies and institutions, etc.

- **History**: While there is a long tradition of indirect government support for internationalization, more direct and strategic actions, policies, and plans have only appeared more recently.

- **Geographic focus**: In general, there is a growing regionalization of internationalization. European policies are here a best practice example. When looking at the global picture, national internationalization strategies are prevalent in Europe, but not so much in other regions of the world.

- **Tactical focus**: Some strategies are rather generic, while others have specific focal points or action lines that frame the scope of activity or interest (for instance inbound or outbound mobility).

- **Effectiveness**: Little is known on the effectiveness of national policies. This can be explained by the fact that most policies are quite recent so there are few, if any, studies assessing their effectiveness as instruments. Thus, the evidence is usually anecdotal or reliant on quantitative measures related to internationalization abroad (i.e., international student mobility).

Policy Mimicry

In low- and mid-income countries, the process of developing national policies is mostly top-down, policies are mostly directed from South to North, and they relate either to inbound mobility (as in India for instance), or to outbound mobility (Brazil), or to mobility both ways. Mobility is central in most policies and plans, followed by research and publication collaboration; networks and consortia; and enhancing quality and aspiring to international quality standards. “Internationalization at home” and “internationalization of the curriculum,” as well as national and foreign language policies, are mostly absent. The same applies to attention to social justice, inclusion, and equity. Although there is a noticeable increase in the numbers of these policies, there is also a degree of “policy mimicry,” in that these countries appear to adopt many aspects of the Western paradigm of internationalization by focusing heavily on mobility, reputation and branding, and South–North relations. At the same time, they appear to sustain the dominance of high-income countries through the structure and terms of their scholarship schemes, geographic priorities, and choices with respect to partnerships in education and research. More attention to regional cooperation (South–South networking and partnerships) and a stronger focus on internationalization of the curriculum at home are needed to break through the high-income countries’ paradigm of internationalization and to develop policies and actions building on local, national, and regional contexts, cultures, and strengths.
German Universities Woo International Students

Simon Morris-Lange and Cornelia Schu

More students than ever before are studying at German universities. These young talents are unevenly distributed across the country. In our recent study Countering Demographic Decline – How Germany’s Shrinking Universities Attract and Retain International Students, we found that one in six of Germany’s 263 public universities and universities of applied sciences currently has (significantly) fewer students enrolled than in 2012. The reason is demographic change. Low birth rates and the depopulation of certain regions of Germany mean that in some areas the number of domestic students is declining. That, in turn, is the reason why 41 universities are currently shrinking—and this trend is increasing. This downturn is also exacerbating skills shortages in the German labor market, which are already being felt in some sectors, for example in mechanical engineering.

International Recruitment

Germany’s shrinking universities are responding in different ways to the drop in domestic student enrollments. In 26 of them, this decline goes hand in hand with a significant increase in numbers of international students. Between 2012 and 2017, the number of international students enrolling at these universities has increased by an impressive 42 percent. And although international students still account for only a fraction of the student population at these institutions (namely 12 percent), they are already helping to compensate for the declining numbers of domestic students. Going forward, these students will also help to increase the international visibility of these universities.

The latest population forecasts indicate that Germany’s shrinking universities are giving a preview of the challenges that other institutions in Germany and in other European countries will soon be facing, too. The ways in which they are tackling the decline in domestic students could, therefore, become greatly relevant. That is why we at SVR Migration conducted a study to find out what shrinking universities are doing to attract international students, prepare them for their study programs, and retain them in the local job market once they graduate.

Germany’s shrinking universities tend to be less well known internationally and are less visible than top-ranked universities or universities located in major cosmopolitan cities. However, even shrinking universities benefit from the fact that having a German university education is widely seen as a desirable attribute and that tuition fees are much lower than in most other countries. Nevertheless, systemic obstacles make it more difficult for shrinking universities to attract international students: Germany’s university admissions process is complicated, student visas are often issued quite late, and many prospective students have to spend a lot of time and money proving upfront that they have the necessary language and academic skills. Our research shows that shrinking universities are getting better at overcoming these obstacles. They reach out to prospective international students at their various stopping-off points en route to Germany, for example in language schools in Germany and at partner universities/schools abroad, as well as, increasingly, on the Internet and on social media.

New Pathway Programs

Nevertheless, student recruitment is only part of the story. Dropout rates are a matter of concern, too. In Germany, the average dropout rate among international students is 45 percent for those studying for a bachelor’s degree and 29 percent for those enrolled in master’s programs. That is higher than the proportion of their German counterparts (28 and 19 percent, respectively). To help reduce dropout rates, the shrinking universities
included in our study offer German language courses, an orientation program, and other support. However, this support is not always available in all programs, or it is only accessed by those who actively seek help and guidance. Many international students wait too long before finding out what support is available, or never do at all. This is the reason why poor exam marks and other warning signs are often not noticed until it is too late. Germany’s pathway colleges (Studienkollegs) have traditionally been responsible for running one-year preparatory courses for international students. To complement these, some universities have now introduced their own one- or two-semester pathway programs. These alternative pathways to higher education in Germany could prove to be a key factor for academic success. So far, however, only universities in five of the 16 federal states are legally permitted to run pathway programs with integrated university admission tests (Brandenburg, Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland, and Thuringia). And even these federal states are still in the process of developing and testing relevant programs.

Future Labor Migrants
Increasingly, international students are not only seen as students, but also as skilled migrants who can help offset looming talent shortages in the German economy, especially in and around shrinking university towns. That is why universities in these towns are offering support to those who intend to stay, some even in cooperation with regional partner organizations. The aim is to help graduates make the transition into the German job market. Shrinking universities offer international students the opportunity to take part in career development workshops that are tailored to their needs, and put them in contact with local businesses. So far, this custom-fit support has been funded by project grants from Germany’s federal government and federal state governments, and from the European Union. However, it remains to be seen whether this temporary funding can be continued once the temporary government grants run out.

Lessons for an Aging European Continent
Germany’s shrinking universities are already facing these and other challenges. In the future, though, others across Germany and other European countries will be confronted with the same problems. That is why universities and their partners should provide international students with more flexible options for accessing higher education, as well as relevant support. In addition, their transition from study to work should be facilitated more. Starting in April 2020, the second installment of Germany’s government program “Integrating Refugees in Degree Programmes” (which is open to all international students) can be regarded as a step in the right direction.
Managing Internationalization in a Complex Research Landscape

Tommy Shih

In the past decade, internationalization has received stronger attention in the strategic documents of universities all over the world. With regard to research, internationalization refers to activities and processes that seek to integrate a global dimension in order to improve research impact and quality. Empirically, internationalization has demonstrated a number of positive effects on research, such as stronger productivity and quality, increased dissemination of findings, widened access to resources, and more intensive cultivation and circulation of ideas. While it is acknowledged that internationalization has created added value for nationally embedded research and higher education institutions, recently it has also become an issue of strategic concern at the national and institutional levels, since a broader diversity of countries today participate in high-level and high-quality scientific activities. Some of these countries have not traditionally been considered strong science nations.

China in particular is standing out from the crowd. It is today the largest producer of scientific articles in the world and is a counter pole to the United States and Europe within many fields, also with respect to quality. The total amount of research and development investments in China exceeds that of the European Union. China is not the only country that has experienced rapid growth in research output. Countries such as India, Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, and others have also quickly improved their scientific capacity. In Europe, this development has not gone unnoticed in academic and policy circles, and it is the topic of many discussions at both the national and multilateral levels.

Increased Awareness in Europe

Lately, university administrations in Europe have had to increase awareness and take action on a broad number of issues with respect to internationalization of research, such as export controls regulations, national security issues, data regulation, ethics dumping, etc. The need to deal with these issues in a structured way has arisen in other parts of the world as well, not the least in the United States. In Sweden, representatives of academia, civil society, and government show increasing concern that internationalization should be pursued responsibly. University administrations focus specifically on the need to assess challenges and opportunities related to international collaborations. This need is particularly pertinent when cooperating with partners in countries with rapidly developing research systems or with histories of corruption or human rights violations, or in countries that are not governed democratically.

Recently, a network of research-intensive universities in Sweden consisting of Lund University, Karolinska Institutet, and KTH Royal Institute of Technology, together with the Swedish Foundation for Internationalization of Research and Higher Education, has started working together to provide guidelines for responsible internationalization and push for deeper reflection among researchers building collaborative relationships in an international context. There is a particular focus on collaborations with countries governed by authoritarian governments, or whose research systems have developed rapidly. In such collaborations, it is particularly important to balance the benefits with the risks associated with working in such an environment. While collaborations are most often formed between individuals, we must be aware here that research activities are embedded in institutional contexts with diverse norms and regulations. Some of the risks that have been identified are related to different areas. In my discussions with researchers,

Abstract

Universities seeking to produce relevant research need to be involved internationally. This creates opportunities, but also causes clashes related to research norms and practices. A new tool set is needed in order to internationalize research responsibly.
administrative staff, and university management in Sweden, some of the most pressing concerns include actual risks for the personal safety of test subjects or researchers; ethics dumping; dual use of technology; restrictions on academic freedom; reputational risk to the university or the researchers; and guilt by association (by working with researchers from certain countries).

Such risks are of course not only present in collaborations with researchers in emerging science nations, they may also concern collaborations with researchers in higher-income/Western countries. However, the rapid development of a research system is sometimes associated with a lag in regulation and a lack of experience in handling, for instance, ethical transgressions or infringements on intellectual property. Moreover, authoritarian states have often been criticized for their attacks on academic freedom and lack of respect for human rights. However, these conditions alone should not be reasons to restrict global scientific collaboration, with the exception of obvious cases where, for example, collaborations violate human rights, academic freedom is clearly affected, or test subjects are in immediate danger.

Toward a Structured Approach
The long-term solution must be to maintain open borders and freedom to conduct science—with responsible research practices. As history has shown, this is indispensable to advance science for the benefit of humanity and to find solutions to global challenges. Nonetheless, we should not ignore the obvious challenges that we are facing with a more diverse science landscape and blurred lines between science, politics, and business. Today, internationalization needs to be conducted in a more informed and responsible fashion—down to the individual researcher. In this respect, the Swedish university network has crucial dimensions to consider: with whom, why, and how a collaboration takes place; institutional autonomy; cultural and social contexts; legal contexts; and research ethics.

Universities and their management teams need to be aware of their responsibility in setting up an enabling, well-informed, and structured environment for researchers engaging in international collaborations. A structured process, administrative support, and resources are needed to identify, assess, handle, and monitor opportunities and risks of international collaborations. Rather than setting up barriers, the way forward for universities must be to enhance their competencies and abilities to manage internationalization, in order to reduce risks and increase possibilities for mutual benefits.

Central Asia: Crossing the Threshold at Different Speeds
Farkhad Alimukhamedov

Despite being located in a landlocked region, Central Asian countries have been significantly influenced by global changes when shaping their higher education policies. Although experiencing similar challenges during the transition period after the end of the Soviet Union, five countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—developed internationalization policies showing sharp differences. For instance, in 2010, Kazakhstan joined the Bologna Declaration and became a member of the European Higher Education Area, while Turkmenistan adopted a two-tier bachelor-master system only in 2013.
Big changes start with small steps. In the early 1990s, some universities (such as KIMEP University in Kazakhstan and the University of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan) and faculties (schools) in the region started to offer programs in English. A few years later, new universities with foreign partners (Kazakh–British Technical University, Kyrgyz–Slavic University) and branches of foreign universities (Westminster International University and Turin Polytechnic University in Uzbekistan) were introduced in the region. Currently, the governments of these three countries are introducing significant reforms in diploma recognition and the recruitment of international staff and students, demonstrating attention to internationalization.

Student Mobility, A Priority in Internationalization

Student mobility plays a major role in all five countries. Currently, the majority of Central Asian students who study abroad are “free movers.” Their numbers may further grow in future years given the increasing number of actors involved in international student mobility in the region, reduced interference against outbound mobility, and swifter recognition. With a ratio of outbound mobility of more than 10 percent, student mobility from Central Asia is the highest in the world according to the UNESCO Institute of Statistics. In 2016, there were about 90,000 Kazakhstani students abroad (and around 70,000 in 2019), representing a net flow ratio of over 11 percent. Yet, this is well below the goal stipulated by the Strategy for Academic Mobility in Kazakhstan 2012–2020, of 20 percent of the total cohort of Kazakhstani students mobile by 2020. Although the number of Uzbekistani students abroad is lower compared to Kazakhstan (34,000 in 2017), outbound student mobility, at over 12 percent, is increasing steadily. Turkmenistan is the only country in the region where the number of students studying abroad (47,456 in 2014) exceeds the number of those studying at home. UNESCO data shows that with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, which has a positive net flow of internationally mobile students—3,397 in 2017, the four other countries are all “student-sending” countries.

Russia hosts almost 60 percent of all Central Asian students. Its preeminent position is the result of the relatively better quality and ranking of Russian universities, along with historical, practical, and linguistic reasons. Web of Science data shows that Russia is the main scientific partner of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Dr. Maia Chankseliani, associate professor of comparative and international education at the University of Oxford, explains post-Soviet outbound student mobility in terms of world-systems theory: “While peripheral for the core countries, Russia is a core country for post-Soviet states.”

Central Asian students do not have, as a group, one main second destination country. Many factors such as political stability and economic performance, tuition fees, and living costs in the destination country may influence their choice. For example, the political crisis in Ukraine had a direct influence on the mobility of Turkmen students, and migration flows were partly redirected to Belarus. The Czech Republic, Latvia, Hungary, and Poland have also become destination countries, showing changing dynamics related to the increasing interest of Central European countries in attracting international students. The rapid increase in the number of Kazakhstani students heading for the Czech Republic and Uzbek students for Latvia shows how outbound mobile students from the region spread out to new destinations. The choice of some host countries may also be influenced by immediate work possibilities, as student status also provides part-time job opportunities—an important factor for self-financed students.

Internationalization, A Strategy with Long-Term Objectives

In the majority of Central Asian countries, the internationalization process is reaching an important milestone, slowly moving from being a tool to becoming a target. Governments and higher education institutions show changing rationales and attempt to focus on structural changes. Internationalization is considered a way to provide a better quality of education and introduce new teaching trends and research methods. By targeting quality, international scientific cooperation, and harmonization, the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek governments show their concern for the increasing role of education as a means to widen intercultural competence and knowledge of other cultures. Scimago-based data of the performance of Central Asian countries also shows that their research outputs are increasingly dependent on international cooperation. Consequently, Kazakhstan, a
China’s Internationalization of Higher Education: The Barrier Within

Rui Yang

The internationalization of higher education is centered on internationalism. It is, however, often misperceived as emulating the experience of the West in a global context of Western dominance. Such an understanding is theoretically inaccurate and practically infeasible. As part of the much wider interplay between civilizations, the internationalization of higher education has to be like a two-way traffic flow of culture. Within this process, universities have a unique role to play, both as a product and as a producer. Every member of the human community needs to be good at both learning from others and reaching out to the world.

A Good Story Told Poorly

Historically, China has been doing extremely well in the former, that is learning from the other, but has fallen much behind in the latter, that is reaching out to the world. Although home to one of the world’s oldest continuous cultures, China has not been successful at leading student-sending country, is also becoming a leading host country with increasing numbers of international students. According to the Kazakh ministry of education and science, in 2019, Kazakh universities hosted more than 25,000 students—9,000 more than the previous year.

International rankings and international recognition play a growing role in national higher education strategies and plans. Although academic rankings show that Central Asian universities hardly fall into the category of top-ranking institutions, it is noteworthy to point out the presence of two Kazakh universities among the top 1,400 universities, according to the Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2020. According to QS World University Rankings 2020, there are 10 Kazakh universities among the top 1,000, showing the efforts of academia and policy makers to improve institutional standing. Uzbekistan is also determined to move its internationalization process forward by providing increasing opportunities for foreign universities (e.g., exempting them from all taxes until 2023).

Currently, Central Asian universities try to take advantage of opportunities arising through internationalization. Erasmus+ results show that the International Student Mobility and Capacity Building in Higher Education programs have a higher rate of participation in Central Asia (particularly in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan) than in many other Asian countries. Cooperation with the European Union may also increase regional cooperation and provide new windows of opportunity. Tripartite cooperation with external partner universities (from Russia, China, or the United States) in new mobility frameworks may also influence the rate of interregional mobility and of regional identity among Central Asian youth.

In sum, the internationalization process of this landlocked region shows that besides mobility, other important elements such as quality and international cooperation have gained importance over time. Every country, however, is at a different stage of its internationalization process, and the gap between them may further increase.
sharing its stories. Chinese culture has not blossomed in many parts of the world. China is still not beloved abroad, at least not to the extent that it wishes. China is not perceived as appealing, despite its long and rich history. Chinese culture and its symbols do not hold a powerful allure for many other nations. Even with its remarkable recent developments, there has not been an explosion of Chinese cultural exports in the world.

This blemish is especially visible in the operation of Confucius Institutes, which are accused of being a conduit for Beijing to spread propaganda under the guise of teaching, of interfering with free speech on campuses, and even of spying on students. While the accusations and the skepticism are often unduly based on cultural prejudice, there are also issues on the Chinese side of the debate, due mainly to barriers within the culture.

Chinese visitors to Western universities often share a familiar experience that except for those who specialize in China studies, very few members on campus understand the Chinese culture. This contrasts sharply with the wide knowledge of the West in Chinese universities. China's falling behind the West in economic and technological development over the past two centuries is not a sufficient explanation. There are more fundamental reasons.

### China's Inward-Looking Cultural Trait

During its long dynastic past, Chinese culture heavily influenced neighboring societies. Yet, the Chinese expressed little interest in other cultures. Buddhism was introduced into China from India over two millennia ago. According to the *Biographies of Eminent Monks* by the Liang dynasty scholar-monk Shi Huijiao (497–554 CE), the move was originally made by Indian monks. Some Chinese monks and believers later went on pilgrimages to India. Yet, components of Chinese culture such as Confucianism and Daoism did not travel to India with them.

Based on the *Book of Tang, Dao De Jing* was once translated into Sanskrit. However, according to Peking University Professor Ji Xianlin, whether or not it was introduced into India remains to be proved. Even though it was translated into Sanskrit, it did not have any influence on Indian culture, and cannot be found anywhere in India today. During the Han (206 BCE–220 CE) and Tang (618–906 CE) dynasties, while many Buddhist scriptures were translated into Chinese, few Chinese classics were translated into Sanskrit and spread in India.

Historically, since the second century, monks from India and Central Asia frequently went to China. Some even spent the rest of their lives there. In contrast, Chinese pilgrims did not start traveling to India and Central Asia until the Three Kingdoms (220–280 CE), and their number was much smaller. Furthermore, the only purpose for the Chinese to travel abroad was Buddhist scriptures. None of them attempted to bring Chinese culture to India.

From the Sui dynasty (581–618 CE), Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese monks and students traveled to China to study Buddhism and Confucian classics. They also learned Chinese music, dance, architecture, and cooking. They went back with many Chinese books covering a wide range of topics, including literature, history, and biographies. In comparison, during the same period, the Chinese showed little passion for the indigenous cultural traditions of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.

Since the early nineteenth century, tens of thousands of young Chinese have gone to the West to study, while Western universities have been established in China to disseminate ideological and religious values into Chinese society. By the late nineteenth century, China's natural, human, and social sciences had all been patterned after Western experience. Until today, China's cultural mix has not been rebalanced. China has not been able to build a value and knowledge system that can effectively serve its social and cultural demands. Over the period, Chinese culture was introduced into Europe through Western missionaries—not by the Chinese. Throughout the process, China has been proactively learning from the West, while rarely disseminating its own values and culture abroad.

### A Mismatch between Taking In and Reaching Out

Through the times, China has always been taking in other cultures, while not spreading its own abroad. This happened both when China was powerful, such as during the Han and Tang dynasties, and weak, as during the late Qing dynasty (1644–1912). As a result,
except for a handful Sinologists, most Westerners have an extremely limited familiarity with the people and society of China. To most, Chinese culture means little more than things like raising the red lantern and dragon boat racing.

Internationalization is necessarily about a give-and-take relationship between world cultures. While in line with the times, the much-desired mutual understanding of, and respect for, others have rarely been demonstrated in the interplay of civilizations. When encountering other peoples, nations have shown differing attitudes and features, which have shaped the processes and outcomes of their internationalization, and are further complicated by the attitudes and features of those with whom they are interacting, in a global geopolitical asymmetry.

For millennia, Chinese culture has shown its extraordinary ability to incorporate elements from outside. Surprisingly, it has been reluctant to spread itself beyond its borders. In this regard, its widely recognized sophistication does not help much. Rather, it leads to Sino-centricism, which has shifted drastically from a feeling of arrogance to that of inferiority after repeated defeats during modern times. Both feelings, however, are signs of the same inward-looking nature of the culture—confined to its own comfort zone, without forging ahead. China’s past—imperial or otherwise—strongly shapes its views of the world, of itself, and of its place in the world. It is time for Chinese policy and intellectual elites to engage in deep introspection on this historical matter.

For long in history, the Chinese have waited for others to come and pay tribute to their culture, and have travelled across the oceans to seek truth and knowledge from the West since the nineteenth century. In the present era of unprecedented human connectivity, and based on a rising Chinese power, the leadership wants to project Chinese influence globally. Yet, the inward-looking cultural trait manifests itself thoroughly at the individual, institutional, and systemic levels, with performance falling behind expectations. The inefficacy of the Confucius Institutes is just one example. In their pursuit for genuine internationalization, members of the Chinese higher education system badly need to readjust their cultural mentality.

Abstract
The Chinese ministry of education has announced a major reform in which the nation’s annual college entrance exam, the gaokao, plays a fundamental role. Titled “Foundation Enhancement Plan,” it takes unprecedented steps and resources to select and cultivate talents to feed directly into China’s national strategic goals. Thirty-six top-tier institutions are in the pilot group. The toughest admission criteria are in place to select the qualified few who will undergo rigorous learning throughout college and beyond to ensure China’s future success.

Unprecedented Talent Program for China’s Strategic Goals
Xiaofeng Wan

On January 15, 2020, China’s ministry of education announced a major reform involving the gaokao, the nation’s annual college entrance exam. Titled “Foundation Enhancement Plan” (FEP), the reform aims to pair college education with China’s national strategic goals through enhanced teaching in foundational majors such as math, physics, chemistry, biology, history, philosophy, and Chinese paleography. Graduates are pipeline into industries of national interests such as high-end chips, software and artificial intelligence, new materials, advanced manufacturing, and national security, as well as the humanities and social sciences, where top talents have been scarce. Thirty-six higher education institutions will be among the pilot group testing the plan, the same 36 institutions classified as Class A universities under China’s Double First Class University Plan initiated in 2015.

The announcement of the plan also marked the end of the Independent Freshman Admission Program (IFAP) implemented from 2003, which allowed elite universities to cherry-pick top talents through a combination of institutional criteria and gaokao score.
Through IFAP, successful candidates often enjoyed significant advantages in the admission process, including a lowered gaokao score threshold. The program’s goal was to help institutions to recruit and enroll students who are talented in a specific area but may not perform as well on the comprehensive gaokao. Over the course of the program, universities that made use of IFAP enjoyed significant autonomy in selecting the students whom they wanted, but the subjective component of the admission process often drew criticism over its lack of transparency and, at times, dubious admission practices.

Not merely an admission strategy like IFAP, FEP, given its mission-driven nature, expands beyond the admission process into talent cultivation for years to come. Students admitted under FEP cannot freely choose majors once in college as they would under IFAP. In other words, a student’s academic path for all four years in college and subsequent postgraduate studies is sealed at time of admission.

Targeted Students and Admission under FEP
FEP opens its doors to only two types of students. The first type is students who score among the highest on the gaokao; the second type is students who have demonstrated extraordinary talent in certain academic fields in addition to stellar performance on the gaokao.

Contrary to IFAP, where the process took place before gaokao score release, FEP centers on the gaokao, as the score will be the main criterion used by participating universities to shortlist students, replacing academic awards such as the Olympiads, research papers, or patents. Universities will combine a candidate’s gaokao score, the university’s own assessment score, and the overall quality assessment score from high school into a composite score. Among them, the gaokao score weighs no less than 85 percent of the equation.

Unprecedented Benefits
Students admitted under FEP are granted access to many exclusive privileges: specially designated classes equipped with first-class faculty, abundant academic resources, and small class size; loosened admission requirements for postgraduate studies; access to funded study-abroad opportunities and scholarships; exclusive access to national-level research labs and facilities; and strengthened career services. It is not yet clear how many students will be admitted under FEP each year. Previously, universities were capped at enrolling no more than 5 percent of their first-year class under IFAP.

With IFAP, students were shortlisted based on demonstrated talents through Olympiads, academic research, etc. It undoubtedly gave students in resource-saturated top-tier cities a competitive edge, and further disadvantaged those from low socioeconomic backgrounds, particularly those from rural areas. Under FEP, given the central role of the gaokao, students have a relatively equal chance to compete, ensuring a path for more students from underprivileged backgrounds to be considered.

Same Plan, Different Approaches
In late January 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic abruptly brought Chinese society to a halt for three months. Now that the situation is under control, schools across the country have gradually reopened. Among the first groups resuming on-campus learning are high school seniors who will sit for the now postponed gaokao (July 7–8). Universities in the pilot group of FEP have subsequently announced their long-anticipated admission guidelines.

Pilot institutions pour their best resources into their FEP cohorts, promising a tailored academic path for all selected students. On May 7, 2020, Tsinghua University, known for its strong STEM programs, announced its admission plan for this year’s FEP cohort. The elite institution created three academic tracks, including foundational science with an academic focus, offering majors in math, physics, and chemistry; foundational science with a pre-engineering focus, with majors in biochemistry and applied mechanics; and foundational humanities, with majors in Chinese paleography, history, and philosophy. Students will be placed in five specially designed academies to hone their skills in their respective fields. A successive undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral studies path is also made available to the cohort.
Peking University, another top-tier university in China, announced its own guidelines on the same day. Similar to the three tracks at Tsinghua, Peking also created three categories, but with visible emphasis on its famed humanities programs, such as history, philosophy, and Chinese paleography, as well as majors in the sciences, physics, math, bioscience, and medicine.

To be shortlisted by Tsinghua or Peking, as well as all other participating institutions, students have to meet the minimum *gaokao* score threshold for tier-1 institutions set for their respective provinces. Students who have extraordinary talents in certain academic areas have in addition to demonstrate at least a second-place award in national contests. The institutional assessment portion is also said to test knowledge well above the syllabus of regular high school classes, even beyond the rigorous *gaokao*. Recorded face-to-face interviews with a panel of professors add additional layers of scrutiny and assessment.

The unprecedented reform and resource allocation signal China’s ambition of cultivating talents to be self-sustainable for its own strategic developments. The unusually high admission criteria, however, indicate that only a small number of students will be selected, representing the most brilliant of the country’s youth. For these selected few, an arranged path for their four years in college and possibly beyond guarantees a life in security, but one of predictability, too.

### The Belt and Road Initiative and Higher Education

**Aisi Li and Alan Ruby**

Most of the commentary on China’s One Belt One Road strategy (also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, BRI) is about infrastructure, ports, and railways. With more than US$900 billion injected into the project, it is hard to imagine that academic and intellectual cooperation will remain unaffected. In fact, BRI has so far spawned three university alliances.

**The Alliances**

In May 2015, the Universities Alliance of the New Silk Road (UASR) was established in Xi’an, initiated by Xi’an Jiaotong University. Its current membership is 151 universities from 38 countries and regions sharing a mission of developing the Silk Road Academic Belt, promoting regional openness and development, and stepping up exchanges and collaborations. Although it has a specific geographic focus on the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian region, with 40 or more universities from China and more than 20 from Russia, many of its members are from beyond this region—including two from New Zealand and more than 10 from France.

In the same year, 46 universities from eight countries formed the One Belt One Road University Strategic Alliance (OBORUSA) in Dunhuang, Gansu. OBORUSA has grown to include more than 170 universities from 25 countries and aims at developing a common higher education space along the Belt and Road, enhancing higher education exchange and cooperation and facilitating economic and societal growth.

In 2016, the China–Central Asia University Alliance (CCAUC) was established in Urumqi, Xinjiang, with members of 51 higher education institutions in seven countries along the Belt. CCAUC sets out to organize regular forums, enhance student mobility, and credit
transfer between China and Central Asia. In addition, it intends to facilitate the growth of the Confucius Institutes in the region.

Admission to these alliances is relaxed. Although their establishment was prompted by the BRI, membership is not restricted to countries along the Belt and Road pathways. While the networks include China’s coastal universities, the founding members or initiators of all three networks are located in places that are significant on the historical Silk Road. Xi’an was the starting point of the ancient Silk Road, while Dunhuang was a major historic stop, and the most well-known route of the historical Silk Road ran through Xinjiang from the east to its northwestern border. In contrast to the better-known internationalization activities along east and southeast China, these three alliances have brought attention to China’s internationalization efforts in landlocked, but historically important areas.

**Potentials**

Among the three alliances, two have explicitly expressed as a goal the development of a common higher education space, akin to the European Higher Education Area. All three emphasize their role as platforms for international and interregional higher education cooperation, with the ultimate aim of closer economic and social cooperation and development.

The formation of these alliances is a result of top-down and bottom-up efforts, with governments and universities contributing to their establishment and maintenance. Local governments, provincial or municipal, appear to be financially supportive of these alliances. In support of OBORUSA, Gansu provincial government has set up Silk Road Scholarships with an annual fund of RMB 5 million (about US$730,000) to attract international students. This special funding is expected to go up if student demand increases. Similarly, Xi’an Jiaotong University, the founding member of UASR, makes it clear in the alliance’s charter that it will continue to fund the alliance. Although the Chinese government does not have a central fund to support these alliances, financial commitments from local governments and universities are likely to facilitate their further growth.

While all three networks aim to build regional political and social cooperation, collaboration is not restricted to geographical or cultural proximity, as demonstrated in their respective memberships. Instead, the alliances have a global outlook that stretches from China to Asia and beyond, to Europe and the Baltic states. As a result, deepening regional higher education cooperation under the BRI can be interpreted as enhancing global higher education cooperation. After all, BRI’s ultimate aim is to build connectivity globally. Connecting various levels of regions to form a global partnership serves this aim, and thus the alliances are as much regional as global constructions.

**Obstacles**

As these alliances are in their infancy, shared standards have not been established or articulated. A coordinated higher education policy is also absent. As a result, it is too early to discuss harmonization and convergence within these alliances.

As the Bologna Process demonstrated, creating a common higher education space is not without obstacles and takes time, even when there is some cultural and geographical proximity and a lot of labor mobility between nations. The BRI alliances’ ambitious attempts to develop a common higher education space in spite of cultural and geographical differences will involve a variety of languages, academic traditions, and academic calendars. Despite increased flows of students into and out of China, there is less movement of talent among BRI nations to fuel the case for aligning qualifications, compared with the Bologna Process. There are also impediments to the mobility of faculty between the various alliance members. Work visas are not always easy to obtain, and visas for spouses and educational opportunities for dependent children are rare or expensive. None of the alliances offer access to research funds that would provide a basis for sustained collaborative work.
Looking Ahead

Many would argue that these three alliances symbolize China's rising leadership in internationalization of higher education. Yet the alliances are not led by the usual suspects in the capital, Peking University and Tsinghua University, but by Xi'an and others in the Western Provinces, which are beginning to emerge economically. Therefore, rather than simply seeing these networks as symbols of China's ambition to become a leader in internationalization, these networks appear to help institutions that are usually marginalized to gain more visibility, both domestically and internationally. If the student scholarship funds are sustained and a research funding pool established, they are likely to mature and encourage greater academic cooperation.

Introduction to the Section

Daniel C. Levy

A central question raised worldwide by the astonishing growth of private higher education (PHE) is how private is "too private"? The question encompasses both PHE's enrollment share and PHE's nature. A key gauge of PHE's nature is whether PHE is for-profit or nonprofit. Southeast Asia in general, including the Philippines and Vietnam specifically, illustrates some important common, and some intriguing uncommon, responses to the "too private" question.

This section considers who and what determine different responses in different settings. It emphasizes a core tension between abiding normative discomfort with a private presence in higher education and strong social, economic, and political forces that promote PHE, including for-profit PHE. Our subregional overview article draws upon, and contrasts the two ensuing national case studies. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines trails only Indonesia in both total higher education and private enrollments and, like Indonesia, has a private enrollment majority with a substantial for-profit component. Along with Thailand, Vietnam comes next in total enrollment, both with comparatively low private shares—Vietnam being a legacy of Communism's presumed view that any PHE is too much PHE. Yet, stunningly, Vietnam has recently become globally unique for having not only PHE, but for having PHE almost exclusively in for-profit form.
What’s Too Private? Values and Realities in Southeast Asia

Daniel C. Levy

In the categorization of the Program for Research on Private Higher Education (PRO-PHE), Southeast Asia is Asia's third largest subregion in total higher education, trailing South Asia and East Asia, while larger than Central/Western Asia. Yet Asia is so easily the world’s largest region in total higher education that Southeast Asia’s roughly 18 million enrollments (in 2015) exceeds or equals the enrollments of each entire (non-Asian) region, except Europe. In addition, Asia and Southeast Asia’s especially large private shares mean that the subregion’s PHE (8 million enrollments) is easily larger than any entire (non-Asian) region’s, except Latin America. Meanwhile, both the subregion and region fit the new century’s global patterns of continued strong private raw enrollment growth, alongside a relative stabilization in private share—the world’s private share being at just over 30 percent, Asia’s just shy of 40 percent, and Southeast Asia’s at roughly 45 percent. Moreover, although there is no international dataset on for-profit PHE, Southeast Asia and Asia are probably the respective subregional and regional leaders. Indonesia and the Philippines lead the subregion in raw for-profit enrollment, while Vietnam leads the world in the for-profit share of PHE. In sum, regarding both PHE in general, and for-profit PHE in particular, Southeast Asia looms very large.

Great Variations across the Subregion

However, great variation exists across Southeast Asia’s 10 countries, just as it does across Asia and the world overall. The Philippines joins Cambodia and Indonesia in having a majority of private shares, Malaysia falling just short. These four countries account for the aggregated subregion’s permissive answer to the “how much is too much” question, as Indonesia and the Philippines hold well over half of the subregion’s total enrollment. Yet the next largest, Vietnam and Thailand, have private shares only modestly above a tenth of the total national enrollment, joined recently by Brunei; Myanmar is one of the world’s few countries maintaining that “any PHE is too much PHE.” Laos and Singapore lie in between the high and low private-share cases, closer to the global average. Malaysia is the subregion’s leading example of private share increase in the new century, while Vietnam exemplifies stable share, and the Philippines private share decline.

Who Decides What Is “Too Much Private”? 

Vietnam epitomizes the subregional and global extreme of the state deciding what is too private, at least in the 1954–1989 period, and its answer then was that any PHE was too much PHE. Whereas this was North Vietnam’s answer as soon as it achieved independence from France, the answer came to the South when the North vanquished it in 1975 and nationalized all its PHE. We could thus consider the 1975 nationalization, Vietnam’s first “U-turn” (to adopt the term from Chau’s article below), state-driven. State (or party-state) authority was also preeminent for the second U-turn, granting permission for “nonstate” institutions and creation of a framework for them, restricting the U-turn by not allowing for-profit formation. The state then authorized and set the terms of the incredible U-turn that Chau focuses upon, flipping from legally nonprofit-only-PHE into an astonishing legally for-profit-only-PHE, thus hurling past all other countries that allow for-profit but alongside nonprofit. State authority will now largely decide whether to turn once again, to allow nonprofits to form alongside the for-profits, perhaps even to allow the country’s scattered small religious seeds to bear fruit.

Compared to the subregion’s other countries and most of the world, then, the Vietnamese state has been key in deciding how much is too much. It decided first that any PHE was too private, then that for-profit and religious were impermissibly private even
for a nonpublic sector, and now considers whether, how, and how much private might extend to forms other than secular for-profit—as well as how much autonomy from state control to allow for any PHE.

The Philippine trajectory of “who decides what is too private” has been radically different. The decision has been the outcome of powerful societal forces, with state power varying in weight and in terms of how restrictive or enabling it is for private forces. The Philippine PHE history—being much longer than in Vietnam or most of the subregion and region—is key. Akin to Latin America much more than to the rest of Asia, colonialism dates back to the sixteenth century and was Spanish, thus Catholic. As in Latin America, Church–Crown universities were private–public institutions. In contrast to Latin America, however, Spanish rule ended almost a century later and after the 1898 Spanish–American War, yielding to US rule (all the way to 1946, though as a Commonwealth from 1935) rather than to formal independence.

Both these differences contributed to the Philippine colonial universities becoming mostly private in independence, whereas the Latin American ones became overwhelmingly public. US rule then contributed to the early development of both Protestant and secular PHE, including for-profits. In sum, after extended Spanish rule had brought early PHE and especially Catholic development, US occupation stimulated a more diverse and business-oriented sector, setting a very high bar for what is “too private.” Thus, for-profit and international PHE were within practical bounds. Whereas Vietnamese independence brought PHE’s demise, Philippine independence willingly inherited an extensive and diverse PHE with deep roots in society and with powerful dynamics, difficult for the state to control, even when some in office have wanted to do so.

Yet, however stark the contrast between the Philippines and Vietnam as to how much society and markets vs. the state drive boundary-setting on what is “too private,” the cases fit the common contemporary global reality that some mix of contending forces determines the boundaries. Thus, even in the Philippines, normative and policy worries mean ongoing struggles over present and proposed regulations. The state banned for-profit PHE in 1982, but driving nonstate dynamics brought its legal resurrection in 1994—with additional regulation. More startlingly, even Vietnam had de facto PHE before the state issued the legalizing word, and then already had de facto for-profit PHE when the state eventually figured that it might as well opt for de jure status and tax accordingly. Besides, many politicians and their families, just as in the Philippines and many other countries, own private institutions or shares in them. Self-interest looms large in pertinent policies. For all Vietnam’s prior parallels to China in Communism banning pre-existing PHE and, years later, allowing limited and then more openly private PHE, Vietnam allows much more latitude for markets and society to penetrate the state and align with contending factions within the state (while China has, for example, only dabbled with allowing for-profit experiments).

Southeast Asia will continue to be a major domain for what size and shape PHE can take in Asia and globally. As will occur in both those wider settings, Southeast Asia will continue to give varied answers to the question of what is too private, and to who has how much sway in determining those answers within countries. In general, however—and notwithstanding normative wariness and constraining regulations—economic, social, and political forces have led Southeast Asia to give in actual practice comparatively permissive answers to the question of what is “too private.”

Besides, many politicians and their families, just as in the Philippines and many other countries, own private institutions or shares in them.

Daniel C. Levy is SUNY Distinguished Professor, University at Albany, Department of Educational Policy & Leadership, and director of the Program for Research on Private Higher Education (PROPHE), which contributes a regular column to IHE. E-mail: dlevy@albany.edu.
The Philippines’ Two Private Sectors

Karol Mark K. Yee

The longstanding prominence of private higher education (PHE) in the Philippines, and the emergence of different sectors within it, have deep historical roots. As a result of the Spanish colonial legacy of the country, the Philippines’ pioneer higher education institutions (HEIs) were established by Catholic religious orders, beginning with the University of Santo Tomas in 1611 and the Ateneo de Manila University in 1621. With the American occupation came public institutions such as the Philippine Normal University (1901) and the University of the Philippines (1908), for-profit private secular HEIs such as National University (1900) and Centro Escolar University (1907), nonprofits like Jose Rizal University (1919), and sectarian Protestant nonprofits set up by American missionaries, Silliman University (1901) remaining the most prominent.

In response to the growth of private institutions, the Corporation Law (1906) and the Private School Law (1917) provided the initial framework for private establishment and governance. Thus, within just a few years of the Spanish departure, the Philippines already had a basic sectoral structure that resembles the one in place today: an ample and diverse private sector alongside a growing public sector. Since then, private provision has been enshrined in the Philippine constitution (1987). However, this enshrining underscores “the complementary roles of public and private institutions.” “Complementarity” remains a uniting normative principle, suggesting a harmonious relationship between public and private, each sector performing roles for which it is best suited and promoting the “public interest.” In practice, however, debate repeatedly arises over what roles are really in the public interest or are “too private,” amid lingering doubt that profit takes precedence over quality. Complementarity shares the stage with vigorous competition and conflict.

Normative and Policy Challenges to a “Too Private” System

As the sector expanded, policies were formulated, often as a reaction to emerging needs and sometimes conflicting interests. In 1982, legislation mandated newly established private schools to incorporate as non-stock corporations only. This policy proved short-lived, however, with 1994 legislation enabling once more the establishment of stock institutions but, reflecting wariness of their being “too private,” with heightened regulatory controls limiting stock for-profits to capital-intensive courses only, and making them ineligible for any form of direct government subsidy. Recently, the continued expansion and diversification of for-profit HEI forms (e.g., ABE International College, STI), the entry of major local corporations (e.g., Ayala and PHINMA Corporation), and persistent doubts about whether legally nonprofit institutions are truly nonprofit, have triggered state regulations governing the sale, merger, and acquisition of HEIs, and consideration of increasing taxes on private for-profits while decreasing existing government incentives provided to nonprofit institutions.

Regulatory restrictions, coupled with the sustained expansion of public higher education, have accelerated the long-term fall in private share: from about 80 percent in 1990 to 70 percent in 2000, and to just 56 percent by 2015—all this preceding the 2017 legislation to abolish public sector tuition fees. Underscoring how public policy even on other education levels affects PHE size, the extension of secondary education to grades 11 and 12 has left many private HEIs with a suddenly lowered demand, putting many at risk; in 2018, freshmen enrollment declined by 11 percent nationally and 15 percent in private institutions.

Despite all this, Philippine PHE remains a powerhouse with a potent for-profit component, among those Southeast Asian and other Asian countries with a majority of private

Abstract

Philippine higher education has one of the world’s largest and longest standing private sector—in fact, two private sectors, for-profit and nonprofit. In the face of the continued expansion of the public sector, the abolition of tuition fees in the public sector, and the opening up of the higher education market to foreign players, private institutions grapple with their changing roles. This article discusses the evolution of the private sectors, contrasting them to the public sector and to each other.
enrollment. Powered especially by its still strong Catholic base, nonprofit continues to outdistance for-profit in enrollment, with 34 percent vs. 21 percent of the Philippine total. In 2015, of the 2,388 HEIs in the country, 1,262 were categorized as nonprofit (53 percent), followed by 683 public (29 percent), and then by 443 for-profits (19 percent). Notably, it is the nonprofit sector that has the largest share of small institutions (with fewer than 2,000 students). Not surprisingly, the bulk of for-profit HEIs are concentrated in the densest areas of the country: in the Greater Metro Manila area, as well as Cebu and Davao.

**Reality and Reform**

Whereas Filipinos will surely continue to debate both what the actual balance is, and what it should be, between private–public complementarity and competition, a preeminent reality is that the sectors perform greatly differentiated roles. Data on program offerings illustrate this; thus, public HEIs cater to the bulk of demand in costly programs in agriculture and natural science, for example, whereas private HEIs pack enrollments in lower-cost and commercial fields, with for-profits concentrating on hotel and restaurant management, tourism, and nursing, while non-profits offer programs in the humanities, fine and applied arts, and social sciences.

A particular concern is whether profit is compatible with quality. Initial research, however, shows that the relationship may not be simple: Data from the 2016-licensure exams does show private-sector students from small for-profits scoring lowest (although not by much), with large nonprofits scoring highest, but scores correlate more with size than with legal form.

In the influential Joint Congressional Commission on Education (1991–1993) report that paved the way for the reorganization of the Philippine education sector to its present structure, higher education discussions underscored the unplanned growth of public HEIs, which posed significant competition to longstanding private HEIs, and cited the duplication of program offerings. Yet, both challenges persist today. Moreover, on top of the persistent challenges come new ones generated by important recent legislation. The 2017 Universal Access to Quality Tertiary Education Act provides unprecedented student financial assistance programs and the 2019 Transnational Higher Education Act enables the entry of foreign HEIs into the Philippine market. Such policy once again animates debates on the supposed complementarity between public and private institutions. One hopes that these debates will generate a greater understanding of the diverse private sector, encompassing the breadth of for-profits and nonprofits. What is more certain is that evolving realities and policies will continue shaping for-profit and nonprofit higher education in the Philippines—and testing their longstanding vibrancy.

---

**Philippine PHE remains a powerhouse with a potent for-profit component.**

**Karol Mark R. Yee is a doctoral candidate at the University of Cambridge, UK, a senior research fellow at the University of the Philippines, and a PROPHE affiliate. E-mail: kmry2@cam.ac.uk.**
Vietnam: The Unique Case of For-Profit Monopoly

Quang Chau

Despite being a Communist state, which historically is antithetical to private ownership, Vietnam has developed significant private higher education (PHE). The apparent paradox goes even further: Vietnam’s PHE has become a fully for-profit sector.

Emergence of PHE in a Communist State

No such paradox was imaginable at the outset of Communism. Newly independent in 1954, North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) did not allow PHE. When the South Vietnamese regime collapsed, its PHE sector of 11 institutions and approximately 30,000 students (a fifth of the total enrollment) was nationalized. Although initially the state did not anticipate the reemergence of PHE in the late 1980s, it quickly imposed its control over the emergent sector. While the state was busy with financial reforms in the public sector, a group of distinguished Vietnamese mathematicians proposed to establish the first nonstate center for higher learning, Thang Long. The state eventually licensed the center as a closely watched pilot project, but refused to approve any other similar institution before the sector itself was legalized.

The state also dictated that truly private PHE would be unacceptable. “Private,” in the sense commonly understood by the state and society (as in most countries), meant “business.” Accordingly, when eventually legalizing PHE in the early 1990s, the state rejected the term “private” and instead adopted “nonstate” as a politically correct euphemism. The nonstate sector included “people-founded” and “semipublic” institutions—all legally barred from revenue distribution, and thus fitting the mainstream definition in global literature as nonprofits. Yet, nowhere in legal documents was nonprofit PHE defined.

The U-Turn to For-Profit

However, the shape of the emerging nonstate sector seriously challenged the central planning dictates typically applied by Hanoi’s policy makers. The state could not get what it had planned for. Because legal provisions on revenue distribution were neither clear nor consistently interpreted across state agencies, many people-founded universities managed to distribute institutional income to their shareholders. Far outside of any Communist master plan, a unique though as yet unclear U-turn was hesitantly in the making.

By the mid-2000s, acknowledging the profit-sharing practice widespread among nonstate universities, the term “private” became politically accepted and officially adopted in legal documents—in sync with the broader marketization of the economy. However, for reasons not yet fully understood (and despite opposition from many experts and policy consultants), the state went further and mandated that all people-founded universities become private and for-profit. With this U-turn, Vietnam’s PHE became exclusively for-profit by law. Several universities attempted to maintain their people-founded form, and a few newly founded private institutions voluntarily followed the nondistribution principle, but all faced crippling legal constraints. The state insisted that PHE—100 percent of it—be for-profit. Eventually, in reality as well as by law, all Vietnamese PHE became for-profit.

What Does a For-Profit Monopoly Look Like?

Currently, Vietnam’s PHE—with over 267,000 students in 65 private universities—accounts for approximately 15 percent of the total enrollment and nearly double that share of institutions. Overall, the great majority of PHE students are in business, information technology, and language training programs, whereas only a handful of private institutions offer programs in other fields. These are common trends in for-profit PHE worldwide.
For-profit corporations now own many private universities. Several corporations, such as Phenikaa, tend to turn their affiliated universities into their own in-house centers for human resources and for research and development. Others, such as Nguyen Hoang, consider education as their primary business area, actively acquiring many private universities.

**Return of the Nonprofit?**

The Higher Education Law of 2012 was the first to explicitly recognize both for-profit and nonprofit PHE in Vietnam. Whereas the concept of nonprofit PHE had been discussed during the U-turn to for-profit, it took several years before key policy makers could understand and eventually accept it. The current Higher Education Law (2018) defines nonprofits as institutions that do not share their revenue with shareholders.

However, Vietnam’s PHE has remained virtually all for-profit. No for-profit university has yet successfully converted to the nonprofit form, though a few have tried. The only two existing nonprofit universities are both newly established—one by a huge private conglomerate, Vingroup, the other, Fulbright University Vietnam, with tremendous political endorsement and financial support from the US government.

Whether nonprofit PHE will evolve into a meaningful form in Vietnam has sparked debates, and often doubts, among many researchers and retired policy makers. The state has not yet legalized “identity” privates, which are characteristically nonprofit, and principally established by religious associations. In sharp contrast, corporation-affiliated privates such as Tan Tao, Vin, and FLC appear most eager to present themselves as nonprofits. Some critics argue that policy incentives to support “truer” nonprofit privates (e.g., tax deduction and exemption) remain cloudy, and are thus subject to manipulation from well-funded corporations for financial gain, at the expense of quality education. Many experts also doubt the nonprofits’ ability to attract donations, given that current policies have not yet provided sufficient incentives for potential donors and philanthropists. Like its 2012 version, the current Higher Education Law tends to envision nonprofits as entities established by investors who will renounce their dividends. However, these investors are allowed to remain key decision-makers in universities’ boards, and consequently may find opportunities for financial gain, while their presence may deter philanthropists who fear mismanagement of their donations.

Whereas both the emergence of PHE in Communist Vietnam and its ensuing U-turn to fully for-profit came largely as surprises, involving unpredictable swings between market forces and state control, the near future seems more predictable. PHE will likely remain both viable and overwhelmingly for-profit, unless and until the state legalizes the involvement of civil society associations, especially religious ones, in higher education.
How Diverse Are European Higher Education Systems?

Benedetto Lepori and Daniel Wagner-Schuster

What do institutions such as the University of Cambridge, the German Police Academy, and the Academy of Fine Arts of Gdansk have in common? At first sight, they are completely different in terms of core missions, type of education delivered, and subjects taught. Yet, despite wide differences, some commonalities are also present: All these institutions deliver educational diplomas at the tertiary level and they are commonly identified as being part of the same system, generally labeled as a “higher education system.” Providers of tertiary- or even secondary-level degrees strive to be recognized as “higher education institutions” (HEIs), with the assumption that this brings benefits in terms of status, attracting students, and gaining resources from donors.

These remarks highlight the complexity of questions such as: What is higher education? What kind of institutions does it comprise? Can we identify types of institutions and are these common across national systems?

In the European context, such questions have become more complex in the past decades due to the expansion and differentiation of higher education from a core of (research-oriented and PhD-awarding) universities to a much more diverse system. In some countries, new “regional universities” have been created, while professional schools at the tertiary, and even at the secondary, levels have been increasingly integrated into higher education. Marketization also opened new spaces for private HEIs, particularly in the new member states of the European Union. As an outcome of these impressive dynamics, half of the European HEIs included in the European Tertiary Education Register have been founded after 1990.

National states have handled the differentiation processes differently. Some European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, engaged in wide-ranging reform, restructuring professional higher education in a second sector composed of “colleges” or “universities of applied sciences” (UAS), creating so-called “dual” or binary systems. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, decided to widen the “university” label to include professional education, while others let market forces play without strong interventions structuring the system.

Analyzing the structure of higher education systems is not just a scholarly question, but is connected to some core questions about higher education policy at the national and European levels. Most scholars would agree that some level of differentiation is beneficial in order to address diverse requirements such as achieving international research excellence, broadening access to higher education, training professionals, and promoting regional development. But whether differentiation should be created through direct policy intervention—creating types of HEIs by regulation—or through market competition remains unclear.

Providing Empirical Evidence

A major issue in this debate has been the lack of comparable data. Many studies have proposed typologies of HEIs and/or of the structure of higher education systems, mostly based on expert observation of different countries. But typological distinctions such as the one between unitary and binary systems fall short of adequately covering the complexity of national systems, which in most cases comprise more than just one or two types—not to speak of systems such as the French system, which does not fit into any of the proposed types.

A newly published study by the European Tertiary Education Register (ETER) project sheds new light on differences in the structure of European higher education systems. While the broad categorization in unitary vs. dual systems can still be applied, the distribution and differentiation of higher education within Europe is extremely heterogeneous in terms of distribution of students, subjects taught, and the extent of involvement in research.
The study provides a comparative analysis of the structure of higher education systems across all European countries. It builds on a categorization of HEIs in three broad groups: universities (PhD awarding), UAS, and other institutions, such as arts and music schools. It also considers the relative importance of these groups in terms of student numbers and composition of the student bodies (by educational level and by subject domain).

Based on this data, the study provides a comparative analysis of the structure of higher education systems across all European countries. It builds on a categorization of HEIs in three broad groups: universities (PhD awarding), UAS, and other institutions, such as arts and music schools. It also considers the relative importance of these groups in terms of student numbers and composition of the student bodies (by educational level and by subject domain).

The report shows some systematic patterns, such as that UAS play a larger role in Northern and Western Europe than in Southern and Eastern European countries. However, while the broad categorization in unitary vs. dual systems can still be applied, the distribution and differentiation of higher education is extremely heterogeneous within Europe. In Bulgaria, for example, 97 percent of students are enrolled in universities. The Netherlands, on the other hand, have a high share of (mostly professional) higher education concentrated in UAS (61 percent of all enrolled students). In Latvia, as a further example of students’ distribution, other institutions, such as academies and private, specialized higher education institutions, enroll a larger share of students (34 percent) than universities and UAS. The report also displays systematic differences in terms of subject composition, with UAS and other HEIs being more specialized than universities. As for research, universities have a clear mandate for research activities, while this is partly the case for UAS and other institutions. Eighty-nine percent of all universities in the ETER dataset are research active, which is also true for 72 percent of all UAS and 33 percent of all other institutions.

The historical dynamics, as observed through the foundation years, are also very different by HEI category. While some universities date back to the Middle Ages and a large number of them were created in the 1950s and 1960s, most UAS and many other institutions were founded after 1970, constituting a second wave of expansion of higher education.

Moving forward, this work will be refined by developing a more fine-grained classification that takes into account three complementary dimensions: the regulatory characteristics (such as the official label and the right to award a PhD), the institutional mission and self-representation of the HEI, and the actually observed activity profile in terms of education, research, and third mission. This will allow a much more accurate observation of the diversity of national higher education systems in Europe.
How Does Irish Higher Education See Itself?

Ellen Hazelkorn and Tom Boland

In July 2019, the Irish government published proposals to reform higher education (HE) governance in response to growing concerns around perceived mismanagement or misgovernance. For institutions, such changes pose threats to autonomy to manage internal, institutional affairs by a political system wedded to command and control.

HE governance varies between countries. Some have direct ministerial responsibility for higher education while others have an intermediary or buffer organization. Ireland is similar to Hong Kong, Israel, New Zealand, and Scotland in that the higher education authority (HEA) provides oversight, funding, and policy advice and policy implementation. New legislation proposes to rename the HEA as the Higher Education Commission, and to give it additional regulatory responsibility for all higher education providers.

Proposed changes coincide with growing student enrollments, global competition, and ongoing funding constraints, putting the system under considerable pressure. This confluence of factors seemed an opportune moment to survey how higher education views itself and is viewed by others on issues such as national policy; quality and relevance to skills needs; international education; governance, management, and accountability; and research.

The Higher Education Report 2019, setting out the results of a survey sent to senior leaders in Irish higher education and key stakeholders, was published in November 2019. Of the positives, respondents indicate strong endorsement of the quality of the system and its relevance to the needs of the Irish economy. There is strong support for key strategic objectives for higher education, such as engagement with the skills agenda, cross-institutional collaboration, and the redesignation of polytechnics as technological universities following a stringent assessment process. There is also strong support for a bigger role for private providers, for alignment of further and higher education, and for a better balancing of the research, teaching, and learning missions of higher education.

Lack of Confidence in Themselves and Senior Colleagues?

But issues of accountability, regulation, institutional governance, and management are all viewed negatively by respondents. A key fault-line in the debate on Irish higher education is the degree to which HE institutions (HEIs) have the freedom to manage their own affairs vs. measures of accountability, which all agree are necessary, but which amount to heavy-handed regulation. While institutional autonomy is guaranteed under Irish law, for 52 percent of respondents to the survey that is not their lived experience. Twice as many respondents consider that the current system of regulation exercised by the department of education and skills and the Higher Education Authority is not appropriate, as respondents that think that it is. Eighty-seven percent believe that the performance of HEIs is negatively impacted by public sector constraints (e.g., in terms of pay, control of staff numbers, etc.).

At the same time, respondents believe that current institutional governance and management systems are not appropriate for the challenges facing higher education. Only about 30 percent of respondents agree that governing boards understand their role or that HEIs have clearly allocated responsibilities for decision-making at all levels of governance and management. A similar proportion thinks management processes, e.g., strategic planning and review, risk assessment, and performance management, are successfully implemented by and embedded in institutions. Just over 20 percent believe institutional management capability is appropriate to the standards required to meet current challenges and responsibilities facing higher education.

Abstract

A survey of senior leaders in Irish higher education shows considerable support for key national objectives for higher education, but issues of accountability, regulation, institutional governance, and management are all viewed negatively by respondents. The survey and this article were completed before the COVID-19 pandemic, which has presented a whole new set of issues for governments and institutional leaders. Yet all these issues remain relevant.

Of the positives, respondents indicate strong endorsement of the quality of the system and its relevance to the needs of the Irish economy.
Internal communication processes fare no better. Double the proportion of respondents say that staff are not informed of key developments and decisions in an appropriate and timely way, as say that they are. Higher proportions of negative responses also arise on family-friendly policies, policies to promote gender equality at senior levels, the adequacy of human resource management, and general management capability.

These results, if accurately reflecting the views of the broader HE community and its stakeholders, reveal a worrying lack of confidence in current governance, management, and accountability systems.

Balancing Accountability and Autonomy
Two key issues emerge from the survey with wider international resonance. First, the ability of higher education to respond appropriately, effectively, and efficiently to massification, globalization, and technological change depends on the quality of its governance arrangements and its leadership. This is because change does not just happen but must be led. Yet, as Middlehurst observed, university presidents and other senior leaders often rise through the ranks over time, translating their experience as “amateur academic leaders to effective professionals” with little initial or continuous professional development. Many universities are confronted by a leadership succession crisis. Fifty-seven percent of respondents believe that reform of academic and administrative structures is essential in enabling the Irish higher education system to achieve world leading status, while a mere 14 percent see no need for reform.

Second, a key fault-line across many HE systems is the degree to which institutions have the freedom to manage their own affairs (autonomy) vs. the degree to which they are regulated by government (accountability). In the face of growing pressure for higher education to demonstrate greater commitment to the “public good” and student outcomes, tensions are rising. The European University Scorecard 2017, now in its third edition, measures autonomy against four dimensions: organization, financial, staffing, and academic. For Ireland, the picture is mixed, with relatively high levels of autonomy across all dimensions with the exception of staffing, where the moratorium on appointments, introduced in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, remains.

The survey highlights an appetite for reform that gives more autonomy to the institutions, while enhancing the competences and effectiveness of governance, management, and leadership structures. Quite where the balance will be struck remains to be seen, but policy makers would be well advised to consider how standards of governance, management, and leadership can be improved in HEIs rather than reaching automatically for tighter regulation.

Ellen Hazelkorn and Tom Boland are joint managing partners of BH Associates, www.bhassociates.eu. E-mail: info@bhassociates.eu.
Size Matters in Turkish Higher Education

Oğuz Esen

In 2018, 15 new public universities were founded in Turkey. At first glance, this seems to be another new wave of higher education expansion, as we have often witnessed since the 1980s. Three factors make this a compelling policy to examine. First is the way of establishing public universities by splitting existing ones, which was the case for 14 of the 15 new institutions. Second, this development coincided with a recent trend in higher-, lower- and middle-income countries to reorganize and restructure their higher education systems through mergers and consolidation, in the transition from mass to universal access—in other words, in Turkey, developments are defying world trends. In this large-scale restructuring operation, the splitting of institutions affected one third of face-to-face higher education students. Finally, to the best of my knowledge, there is no other country today conducting an operation of such significant size.

Turkey has the sixth largest higher education system in the world, with 7.8 million students in 2019, and 129 public and 73 nonprofit private universities. Smaller-scale private universities account for about 15 percent of face-to-face enrollments. Some prestigious private universities have reached standards rivaling the well-established public universities, but the majority serve as demand-absorbing institutions. The Turkish experience of rapid expansion of higher education with a lack of a broader vision has some implications for other countries facing similar challenges.

Rapid Expansion

In the 1980s, the Turkish higher education system could be described as elitist, with very few higher education institutions and a GER of less than 10 percent. The GER passed the 15 percent threshold in 1992 and reached 50 percent in 2010. Distance education made a major contribution to this enormous expansion. The share of distance learning has been continually increasing, from 11 percent in mid 1980s to 51 percent in 2019, averaging around 40 percent in the last decade. Even without taking distance education into consideration, however, the expansion of higher education is still remarkable.

The Turkish higher education system was radically reorganized just before the transition from elite to mass higher education. Two developments were important in preparing this transition. In 1981, relatively early compared to many other countries, a Council of Higher Education was founded as an autonomous body charged with overseeing all higher education institutions. Second, after the abolition of the binary system separating universities from academies, teacher training schools, and conservatories, some of these institutions were merged to form universities, while others were transformed into faculties (schools) and affiliated to universities in the regions; eight new universities were founded. This step led to the emergence of more comprehensive universities, in line with the dominant global trend of transition from elite to mass higher education.

Before the 1980s, Turkey only had a limited number of universities, all located in the main cities, with faculties and vocational schools as their regional branches, determined by local politics. In 1992, 23 new public universities were founded and the GER expanded, as mentioned above. In this second expansion wave, a different strategy was introduced: The government reorganized the faculties and vocational schools that had been affiliated with the existing universities, creating new, fully independent institutions in each city.

Moving from Mass to Universal

In the early 2000s, access was still a central issue in Turkish higher education. When the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, it set out a target of establishing
at least one public university in each province. At that time, there were only 53 public universities across the 81 provinces of Turkey. In the third expansion wave of 2006–2008, the government established 39 new public universities, increasing the public sector to 94 in total. New universities were located in relatively small and less developed cities. This created a new challenge because of overall faculty shortages, and it was difficult to recruit high quality faculty to the less developed locations. This expansion resulted in a 17 percent increase in the total higher education capacity.

The Bologna Process coincided with the transition of Turkish higher education to universal access. All public and private universities now have curricula in line with the Bologna goals. The Bologna Process improved some of the quality problems caused by rapid expansion. However, contrary to the needs of universal access, 20 new, smaller-scale, highly specialized public universities—focusing on areas such as fine arts, music, health, Islamic sciences, social sciences, and technical and applied sciences—were founded, increasing the higher education enrollment by only 3 percent.

Good-bye Rapid Expansion, Hello Consolidation

In 2018, 14 new universities were created by splitting existing universities, initiating a new era. This increased the number of universities without significantly increasing the overall capacity of the sector. What is the rationale behind this policy? What are the problems that these measures aim to address?

The first issue that comes to mind is efficiency of management, as a result of creating universities of a more manageable scale. However, this cannot be the case for Turkish universities, whose average enrollment, including private universities, is only 19,000 students. Over three decades, the number of face-to-face enrollment increased nine times, but the size of universities increased only 1.4 times.

Research on mergers in higher education has shown that greater size brings economies of scale, cost efficiency, research quality, an enlarged talent pool, and improved domestic and international reputation. It is, therefore, not clear how splitting Turkish higher education institutions into smaller units will increase the efficiency or quality of the system, or improve its reputation and competitiveness.

There are some indications that in the past five years, expansion in enrollments has entered a declining phase. It is possible that this slow-down will be permanent, mainly due to stagnation in growth of the university-age population. If this is the case, a lengthy period of consolidation awaits the Turkish higher education system.

Today, Turkish higher education is at a crossroads. The path to universal access requires a more comprehensive vision to ensure stronger, more competitive universities through consolidation, a reform of the curriculum to include general education, and the improvement of secondary education to create closer links with higher education.
The Evolution of University Chancellorship in Kenya

Ishmael I. Munene

The evolution of the role of university chancellor shows how the Kenyan government has strategically used that position to thwart autonomy and subvert shared governance in public universities. Though the government wields influence through funding and appointment of university heads, the chancellorship offers another layer of subtle state control over universities’ general directions. The type of chancellors appointed sends specific messages on the directions in which the state would like the universities to move, eroding autonomy and shared decision-making internally. While this discussion concerns Kenya, it has significance globally because the balance between university autonomy and politicization is an issue that is relevant everywhere.

In the British tradition, the university chancellor is a ceremonial head of university. This titular head is usually a prominent citizen, a business or political leader. The executive academic and administrative head of the university is the vice-chancellor. As a former British colony whose first university was a branch of the University of London, Kenya follows this arrangement in university governance. The chancellors of public universities are either the head of state or his/her appointees. The chancellors preside over graduation ceremonies, can give advice to the university councils for the betterment of the university, and make recommendations to the cabinet secretary of education for a visitation to the university.

While in theory the chancellor is a ceremonial position, in practice Kenya’s chancellors are able and even expected to steer their universities in specific directions. This power is underlined in the three epochs that characterize the evolution of public universities’ chancellorship in the country, namely the political chancellor; the academic chancellor; and the corporate chancellor.

Political Chancellor
The political chancellor was manifest from independence in 1963 to 2002, when the head of state (the president) was the chancellor of all eight public universities. During that period, the independence-era political party was in power, and until 1992, the country was a one-party political state. The state was authoritarian, with the executive exercising dominance over the legislature and the judiciary. Trade unions and women’s groups were also coopted into the state political apparatus. Political dissent was largely from the academic community; professors and students critical of the state were jailed, exiled, or suspended from the universities.

The chancellor-head of state appointed the university council members and the vice-chancellors and their deputies, all selected on the basis of their perceived political loyalty to the state. These university administrators steered universities along specific political paths, including firing politically vocal faculty and expelling opposition-leaning students. Political control of universities was the goal of the political chancellor. As one scholar observed, “University development... (was) guided by directives from sections of the ministries of education or finance and economic development and the chancellor of the public universities.”

Academic Chancellor
The year 2003 saw the political defeat of the independence era ruling party by the opposition. This expanded the democratic space with an independent judiciary and an active legislature. The new head of state declined to be the chancellor of all public universities and, as provided by the public universities law, appointed prominent citizens instead. From 2003 to 2012, the head of state appointed former vice-chancellors and their deputies as chancellors of the public universities. These appointments happened in the context of a
difficult climate for universities: governance and managerial challenges resulting in student and faculty strikes that disrupted learning; financial and resource constraints, including the inability of some universities to generate revenue internally; and an overall decline in academic quality. Further, external multilateral donors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and philanthropic agencies like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations insisted on structural reforms to improve governance, efficiency, and accountability.

There were expectations that academic chancellors would steer the transformation of universities into thriving institutions within the context of neoliberalism. This failed for two reasons. First, the political class still regarded public universities as instruments for political legitimacy. A massive expansion of public universities occurred during this era. Around 70 percent (or 23) of the current 33 public universities were established in the 2012–2013 academic year—as each major ethnic group demanded a public university in its region. Political expediency superseded both resource constraints and the need to stabilize the system for quality enhancement. Second, academic chancellors lacked experience in university governance within the neoliberal context of university development, with its emphasis on the privatization and commercialization of university programs and services. Academic chancellors, therefore, remained ineffective in steering university transformations.

Corporate Chancellor
From 2013 to the present, public universities have continued to experience financial, managerial, and innovation crises of unprecedented proportions, which has heralded the appointment of corporate chancellors. Most universities are still unable to generate additional revenues to make up for a shortfall in government subsidies. Many are financially insolvent and unable to meet basic financial obligations such as payment of salaries and retirement contributions. By the close of 2019, the public universities’ debt stood at US$110 million. Equally significant have been financial improprieties and corruption, which have further eroded the financial viability of the institutions.

Managerial challenges loom large. Frequent closures due to student and faculty strikes have become too common. Further, universities are too caught up in bureaucratic red tape to respond quickly to crises, a legacy of a prior managerial culture of state control and financing. They are also deficient in innovation, as evident in the absence of interdisciplinary courses and entrepreneurship education in academic programs, and the lack of strategic thinking to cultivate new ideas, encourage collaborations, and promote inclusion and diversity. To remedy these challenges, the appointment of chancellors since 2013 has focused on successful bankers, businessmen, chief executives of corporations and insurance, industrialists, and philanthropists. These corporate chancellors are expected to provide the requisite guidance to universities in their transition from a collegial governance model to a corporate managerial culture.

Whether the corporate chancellors will be any more successful than the academic chancellors is doubtful. University ethos differs from that of business and industry; the latter is driven by profit, and the former by knowledge production and dissemination. Corporate culture focuses on efficiency and merit, while universities are sensitive to effectiveness and equity. Corporate governance is top-down, while universities cherish shared governance. Furthermore, universities are largely political, influencing, and being influenced by, national politics, while corporate entities tend to be apolitical. Under these contrasting conditions, it is highly unlikely that corporate chancellors will be successful in steering universities in the direction of desired reforms.

Rather than tinkering at the edges with the chancellorship, it behooves the government to strengthen internal university administration through shared governance. Under this model, university management is shared between the council and senior management on the one hand, and faculty and students on the other. Through their representatives, students and faculty exercise responsibilities for specific areas of decision-making. Matters pertaining to academics and student affairs benefit from broad input from faculty and students, while finance and personnel are managed by administrators. This model ensures that all internal stakeholders participate in planning and decision-making, thereby contributing to accountability.
Rethinking Institutional Strategies for Latin American Universities

Carlos Iván Moreno and Jorge Enrique Flores

The influence of university rankings is stronger than ever. Whether we like it or not, rankings are a powerful tool to heighten prestige and legitimacy and there is no doubt that for highly ranked universities it is easier to attract thousands of students willing to pay exorbitant sums of money in tuition fees and accommodation expenditures. Despite all controversy and methodological shortcomings, university rankings are commonly used by millions of students around the world to select the best universities and academic programs. The influence of rankings among students translates into profitable opportunities for some institutions, but for most universities, rankings have become a pernicious reality.

The Ranking Game: To Play or Not to Play, That Is the Question

Several studies show that rankings are powerful tools that universities use in order to build or maintain an international reputation as centers of academic excellence. But the truth is that building a reputation through rankings is something reserved only for a select group of institutions. We must accept that under the current rules of the ranking game, it will be very unlikely for most Latin American (LATAM) universities to become globally prominent, since worldwide competition at the institutional level is fierce and very expensive.

For LATAM universities, the lack of financial resources is not their only disadvantage. Their institutional orientation and organizational models are important factors that play against them. Most LATAM universities tend to favor teaching over research production, and rankings, whether we like it or not, are all about research productivity. But having an organizational model unfit to play the ranking game is not the only handicap of LATAM universities; when it comes to rankings, they also lack the support of their national governments. Countries such as China, France, Germany, or Russia have improved the performance of their universities in rankings by making the ranking game a matter of national priority. These countries have developed initiatives in order to promote changes in the governance schemes of their universities and allocated additional funds to institutions according to their positions in rankings.

In the 2019 edition of the Times Higher Education (THE) World University Ranking, there was not a single Latin American university among the top 200. Among all LATAM universities participating, only one made it to the top 300 (the University of São Paulo), and to be honest, being ranked 300 is not impressive. One could almost ask if universities in the region should just forget about rankings. Is it game over for LATAM universities when it comes to rankings? The answer might be both yes and no.

Rankings are one of the most influential forces of higher education, and LATAM institutions cannot afford to just step back from them, since rankings play a key role in shaping perceptions about the quality and legitimacy of universities around the world. But rather than trying to gain prestige through competing in rankings, LATAM universities may have better chances to increase their international appeal by focusing on specific niches or academic subjects.

Focusing on Subjects

Positioning LATAM institutions among the top 100 of world university rankings is not very likely to happen in the near future. Universities listed among the top 100 of rankings like THE or QS have at their disposal annual budgets that range between US$3 to

Abstract

Latin American (LATAM) universities rank low in the most influential rankings, which makes them internationally invisible. Competition in rankings requires vast resources. Focusing on niche specializations and specific subjects may be a better alternative to gain legitimacy and boost the attractiveness of LATAM universities, and may facilitate partnerships with better-ranked universities, increasing their international prestige.
Why are Australian Universities Doing So Well in the Rankings?

William Locke

Several media outlets have noted recently how well Australia’s universities appear to have fared in the recent versions of the most influential global rankings. The Times Higher Education (THE) magazine reported that Australia had doubled its representation of universities in the top 100 in its World Reputation Rankings, compared with the previous year. Two more institutions entered the top 200 in the main THE rankings this year (making a total of 11), and one more had made the top 100 in the Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) (making a total of seven). But which universities are improving most, in which rankings, and which indicators in particular, and is this a sudden improvement or are the trends more complicated than this? More importantly, why might this be happening at this point in time?

Which Universities and Which Rankings?
The obvious point to make is that only a small sample of the best-known and most research-intensive Australian universities appear in the higher echelons of the global rankings that receive most attention. So, the performance of the majority is obscured from view and regarded as barely noteworthy by journalists and commentators. Even among these elite few, those universities that have consistently appeared in the rankings from the start have barely moved in recent years. In the THE 2020 ranking, the University of Melbourne’s position (32) remained the same as in the previous year, the Australian National University (ANU) (50) and the University of Sydney (60) each dropped by one place, and the University of Queensland rose by three (to 66). In fact, it is the universities just behind these top four that have improved their positions the most: The University of New South Wales (UNSW) is up 25 places to 71, and Monash University increased by nine to 75. However, the most significant rises for both these universities were not in 2020 but several years ago: between 2012 (173) and 2013 (85) for UNSW and from 2011 (178) to
2013 (99) for Monash. Both have been bouncing around where they are now for the past seven years, but it is the bounces that make the news stories, not the long-term trends.

The improvements for UNSW and Monash are echoed in the other two influential rankings, QS and ARWU. UNSW reached its highest position so far in the QS 2020 ranking at 43, and Monash also peaked in 2021 at 55. In ARWU, Monash improved by 18 places to 73, and UNSW entered the top 100 (at 94) for the first time in 2019 (the latest version), having steadily improved its position since 2003. Other notable rises have been achieved by universities lower down the rankings, such as by Canberra in the THE (up to 193 from 251–300) and QS (456 from 601–650 two years ago), and by the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) in the QS ranking (140 from 160 two years ago) and ARWU (201–300 from 301–400).

**Which Indicators?**
What aspects of these universities’ performances appear to explain these successes? In the THE main ranking, “International outlook” (students, staff, and research collaborations) is the indicator that Australian universities perform best at, followed by “Citations” and “Research” (reputation, income, and productivity). In the QS ranking, the highest indicators by far are “International students” and “International faculty,” whereas they are only mid-ranked in “Academic,” “Employer ratings,” and “Citations per faculty.” Finally, in ARWU, Australian universities perform best in the number of articles that appear in citation indexes and the number of highly cited researchers. However, the indicators that these top ranking universities perform worst at are “Teaching reputation” and “Student-staff ratios.” In Australia, only ANU—a relatively small university by Australian standards—and Bond University (a very small private one) have a student-staff ratio of lower than 20 in the THE ranking.

**Why Are They Doing So Well?**
So, why are these particular Australian universities doing so well in the global rankings and what accounts for the recent improvements of UNSW and Monash? It will not be a surprise to discover that the Australian universities with the highest rankings are the strongest financially—and by some margin, as my colleague, Frank Larkins has confirmed recently. His study of the financially strongest universities in the country over the ten-year period to 2018—with the exception of ANU due to its much smaller size—identifies the same five that have performed best in the global rankings (Melbourne, Sydney, Monash, UNSW, and Queensland). All of them have achieved significant increases in revenue since 2009, but for the top four (excluding Queensland) this has particularly occurred since the introduction of demand-driven enrollments for home students in 2008, and an acceleration of the increase in international postgraduate coursework students since domestic numbers were capped in 2017. The average revenue of these five universities, normalized by equivalent full-time student load, was approximately 50 percent higher than for all Australian universities.

It is the management of these financial resources that has made the difference. In particular, during this ten-year period, UNSW increased its asset base by 75 percent (compared with an average of 40 percent for the country’s whole higher education sector) and its equity base in real terms by 70 percent (compared with 31 percent for the whole sector). Melbourne and Sydney have the largest asset bases, but Monash has been the most effective of these five high performing universities in the deployment of its total assets. However, these universities have not increased their staff numbers proportionately and, apart from highly cited overseas researchers, the staff that they have recruited are largely teaching only, casual, and professional staff, who cost a lot less than academics who are expected to both teach and research. Consequently, all five universities increased their revenues normalized by full-time equivalent (FTE) staff (including casuals) above the sector average, but Monash increased this the most, by 21 percent, compared with 7 percent for all universities.

These universities’ rankings performance has much to do with the management of their financial resources. They have maximized their income by recruiting more international and postgraduate students, and used this to subsidize research, including recruiting highly cited overseas academics and providing them with the best facilities, leading
to improved outcomes. This has improved the universities’ scores in indicators of the proportion of international students and staff, and research outputs and impact, which has consolidated or improved their high overall ranking performance. However, growth in revenue and the increase in staff FTE have not kept pace with student growth, hence their high student–staff ratios and relatively modest teaching reputations. The big question is whether this performance—in financial management and rankings position—is sustainable in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, an unsupportive government, and the geopolitical vulnerability that Australian universities find themselves in.

William Locke is professor and director of the Melbourne Centre for the Study of Higher Education at the University of Melbourne, Australia. E-mail: william.locke@unimelb.edu.au.

IHE Advisory Board

*International Higher Education* has an advisory board of distinguished higher education experts to provide insights, suggest topics, and increase the visibility of the publication.

The Editorial Advisory Board is comprised of the following members:

*Andrés Bernasconi*, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, Chile

*Eva Egron-Polak*, Former Secretary General, International Association of Universities, France

*Ellen Hazelkorn*, BH Consulting Associates, Ireland

*Jane Knight*, University of Toronto, Canada

*Marcelo Knobel*, University of Campinas, Brazil

*Betty Leask*, La Trobe University, Australia

*Nian Cai Liu*, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China

*Laura E. Rumbley*, European Association for International Education, the Netherlands

*Jamil Salmi*, Global Tertiary Expert, Colombia

*Damtew Teferra*, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

*Akiyoshi Yonezawa*, Tohoku University, Japan

*Maria Yudkevich*, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia
Internationalisation of Higher Education

Policy and Practice

☑ 4 issues per year
in English
with 6–7 articles per issue

☑ Unlimited access
to the publication’s website

☑ €268
annual billing + shipping

☑ €241,20 (Online-only)
annual billing + shipping

☑ Campus licences
also available

Internationalisation of Higher Education – Policy and Practice
is a publication for practitioners and policymakers in higher education. It examines internationalisation policies, processes and activities, addressing key issues in the internationalisation of higher education, and placing them in the context of global developments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE VISIT
www.handbook-internationalisation.com
CIHE Publications

New Publications in CIHE Brill/Sense, Series: Global Perspectives on Higher Education.

Refugees and Higher Education
Trans-national Perspectives on Access, Equity, and Internationalization
Volume 47
Editors: Lisa Unangst, Hakan Ergin, Araz Khajarian, Tessa DeLaquil, and Hans de Wit
Publication Date: July 23, 2020
978-90-04-43584-1

Refugees and Higher Education provides a cross-disciplinary lens on one American university’s approach to studying the policies, practices, and experiences associated with the higher education of refugee-background students. The focus is on refugee education as an issue of access and equity, and seen through the lens of internationalization. This publication also offers a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary overview of refugee education issues around the world. It provides key insights for faculty and staff at higher education institutions currently enrolling asylees or refugees, or considering to do so in the future.

Corruption in Higher Education
Global Challenges and Responses
Volume 46
Editor: Elena Denisova-Schmidt
Publication Date: June 18, 2020
978-90-04-43388-5

Lack of academic integrity, combined with the prevalence of fraud and other forms of unethical behavior, are problems that higher education faces in both low-income and higher-income countries, at mass and elite universities, and at public and private institutions. While academic misconduct is not new, massification, internationalization, privatization, digitalization, and commercialization have placed ethical challenges higher on the agenda of many universities. Corruption in academia is particularly unfortunate because of its impact of student formation, and corruption of research has serious implications on the future of science. The contributors to Corruption in Higher Education: Global Challenges and Responses bring a range of perspectives to this critical topic.

The Emergence of the American University Abroad
Volume 45
By: Kyle A. Long
Publication Date: February 17, 2020
978-90-04-42576-7
CIHE Conference on International Higher Education postponed until 2021

The Center for International Higher Education has decided to postpone to 2021 its first biennial Conference on International Higher Education, which was originally scheduled for October 23 and 24, 2020 at Boston College. The preliminary dates are October 22–23, 2021.

Marking the 25th anniversary of both the Center and International Higher Education, the conference is intended to bring together senior academics and leaders in international higher education from around the world, alumni, friends/partners of CIHE, as well as other scholars, doctoral students, and postdocs with an interest in the field. The event will be organized around two tracks—international and comparative higher education, and the internationalization of higher education—and will include invited keynote presenters, panel discussions, and presentations of individual papers.

Digital paper sessions 2020
On October 23–24, 2020, CIHE intends to organize two or three digital sessions featuring the presentation and discussion of selected papers. Paper proposals that have already been submitted are currently under review, and their authors will receive more information on these digital sessions. This information will also be posted on CIHE’s website.

2021 Conference Call for Proposals
The following keynote speakers have confirmed their presence in 2021: Philip G. Altbach and Hans de Wit (Boston College); Simon Marginson (University of Oxford, UK); Rajani Naidoo (University of Bath, UK); and Ly Tran (Deakin University, Australia).

A modest registration fee will be charged to all attendees. The full call for paper proposals and the registration link are both available on the CIHE website. Paper submissions are due by May 15, 2021.

It is our intention to publish some of the presented papers in special issues of Higher Education and the Journal of Studies in International Education (please note: there is no guarantee that a paper selected for inclusion in the conference program will be published in either journal, but all selected papers will be considered).
International Higher Education is the quarterly publication of the Boston College Center for International Higher Education.

The journal is a reflection of the Center’s mission to encourage an international perspective that will contribute to enlightened policy and practice. Through International Higher Education, a network of distinguished international scholars offers commentary and current information on key issues that shape higher education worldwide.